Beyond Master and Slave: Hegel’s Dialectic in Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil §239

 Beyond Good and Evil: Beyond Master and Slave

Introduction: Power Struggles and the Illusion of Progress

In Beyond Good and Evil §239, Nietzsche critiques modernity’s approach to gender relations, arguing that women’s emancipation risks becoming another iteration of a flawed struggle for dominance. Rather than resolving tensions, movements for equality often perpetuate cycles of power reversal. For him, true freedom is not found in inverting roles within a hierarchy but in transcending the framework of domination altogether.

A useful lens for understanding this critique is Hegel’s master-slave dialectic, which reveals that dominance is inherently unstable, as the master depends on the slave for recognition. While Nietzsche does not explicitly engage with Hegel here, his argument echoes the dialectic’s core insight: power over others does not lead to true autonomy. However, where Hegel sees resolution in mutual recognition, Nietzsche suggests a more radical alternative—Selbstüberwindung (self-overcoming). His concern is not just gender but the broader human tendency to define identity through opposition rather than through self-mastery. His critique is ultimately a call to move beyond the reactive pursuit of power and cultivate independent values outside existing social hierarchies.

Women’s Emancipation and the Cycle of Power

Nietzsche perceives feminist emancipation as potentially mirroring the adversarial dynamic in Hegel’s dialectic. He writes, “She wants more, she learns to demand, in the end she finds this tribute of respect almost offensive, she would prefer competition for rights, indeed a real stand-up fight.” This suggests that what begins as a call for equality often transforms into a contest for dominance rather than a fundamental reconfiguration of power itself.

This connects to Nietzsche’s broader critique of ressentiment, the psychological condition in which the oppressed define themselves primarily in opposition to their oppressors. Instead of forging an independent identity, they remain trapped within the very structure they seek to overthrow. In this case, Nietzsche warns that if women seek to “master” men by adopting traditionally masculine forms of power—political authority, economic influence—they may not achieve genuine autonomy but instead reinforce a dynamic of rivalry. He underscores this concern when he remarks, “There is stupidity in this movement, an almost masculine stupidity, of which a real woman—who is always a clever woman—would have to be ashamed from the very heart.” For him, the pursuit of power in the same terms as men risks undermining what he sees as the inherent intelligence and distinctiveness of the feminine. Rather than dismantling structures of power, this approach may merely replicate the same logic of control under a different guise.

The Instability of Domination and Nietzsche’s Critique of Power

Hegel’s dialectic reveals that the ruling class depends on its subordinates for recognition, making domination an inherently unstable position. Nietzsche extends this critique by arguing that assuming power within a pre-existing paradigm does not necessarily mean progress. If women seek power on the same terms that led to male degeneration, they risk inheriting rather than overcoming a decaying system. He notes, “As she thus seizes new rights, looks to become ‘master’… the reverse is happening with dreadful clarity: woman is retrogressing.” This claim is provocative—he implies that the pursuit of external control may come at the cost of deeper, more organic sources of influence. He elaborates on this idea when he states: “That woman should venture out when the fear-inspiring in man, let us put it more precisely and say the man in man, is no longer desired and developed, is fair enough, also comprehensible enough; what is harder to comprehend is that, through precisely this fact—woman degenerates. This is what is happening today: let us not deceive ourselves!”

Here, Nietzsche suggests that the weakening of traditional masculinity does not result in liberation but in a broader cultural decline. If the qualities that once defined male strength—assertiveness, discipline, power—are no longer cultivated or valued, then women do not simply gain autonomy; rather, both genders experience a form of degeneration. This ties back to his broader critique of modernity’s institutions, which he sees as fostering mediocrity rather than true excellence.

Beyond the Master-Slave Dialectic: The Übermensch as an Alternative

Nietzsche’s philosophy resists any teleological resolution. His critique of feminism suggests that true emancipation cannot come from merely exchanging one power relation for another, but he does not propose a model of mutual recognition as Hegel does. Instead, he implies that liberation lies in transcending reactive struggles entirely, a path that points toward the Übermensch.

For Nietzsche, the Übermensch is not a biological category but a psychological and existential ideal—one who affirms life creatively rather than defining oneself through opposition. Rather than engaging in cycles of dominance and subjugation, the philosopher of the future cultivates independent values beyond conventional hierarchies. This marks a fundamental divergence from Hegel: while Hegelian dialectics allow for reconciliation, he rejects resolution in favor of continuous self-overcoming. His will to power does not simply mean struggle for dominance but the drive to create, transform, and surpass oneself. True strength, in this view, does not come from defeating an opponent but from forging a new way of being—one not defined by reaction or opposition.

The Fable of Europe and the Illusion of Liberation

Nietzsche alludes to the myth of Zeus and Europa, where Zeus deceives Europa by appearing as a gentle bull, only to abduct her. This serves as a metaphor for the illusion of progress—modernity seduces women with promises of empowerment, yet may ultimately lead them into another form of subjugation. He cautions, “And is woman now being deprived of her enchantment? Is woman slowly being made boring? O Europe! Europe! We know the horned beast which always attracted you most, which again and again threatens you with danger! Your ancient fable could once again become ‘history’ – once again a monstrous stupidity could master you and carry you off! And no god concealed within it, no! merely an ‘idea’, a ‘modern idea’!”

Through the lens of Hegel’s dialectic, this false liberation reflects the same flawed struggle for power. If women merely exchange one form of dependence for another, they do not escape the cycle of domination. Instead of genuine autonomy, they risk becoming pawns in an ongoing dialectic where control continually shifts but never disappears.

Conclusion: Nietzsche’s Challenge to the Dialectic

Nietzsche’s critique is not merely aimed at feminism but at the entire framework of power struggles. While Hegel’s dialectic suggests that mutual recognition can resolve these conflicts, Nietzsche remains skeptical of any final reconciliation within existing power structures. His argument suggests that power within a declining system is not true power at all—merely the repetition of a cycle that ultimately weakens both the rulers and the ruled.

Yet, his alternative does not simply reject power but redefines it. His concept of self-overcoming (Selbstüberwindung) challenges individuals—both men and women—to rise beyond reactive struggles and create values independent of opposition. This aligns with his vision of the Übermensch, not as a biological destiny but as an existential transformation, where identity is shaped through creative affirmation rather than resistance.

By this reading, Nietzsche’s concern in §239 is not about preserving traditional gender roles but about warning against the dangers of defining oneself through opposition. If women, like men, reject the reactive drive for dominance and instead cultivate independent, life-affirming values, they might break free from the cycle altogether. In this sense, Nietzsche’s critique applies not only to gender relations but to all struggles where identity is formed primarily through negation rather than self-determination.

Bibliography

Nietzsche, Friedrich. Beyond Good and Evil. Translated by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books, 1966.

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by A.V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977, (Chapter IV "Self-Consciousness").