Writing as Origin: Derrida, Nietzsche, Saussure and the Systemic Genesis of Meaning

Introduction

In Of Grammatology, Derrida radically reinterprets the function of writing, not as a derivative of speech but as the foundational structure of meaning itself. Nowhere is this more clearly articulated than in the section The Written Being / The Being Written, where he draws heavily on Nietzsche to advance his deconstruction of logocentrism. Nietzsche's contribution is pivotal: he treats writing not as a secondary inscription of thought or truth, but as a constitutive act that generates meaning. Derrida encapsulates this when he observes: “Nietzsche has written what he has written. He has written that writing—and first of all his own—is not originarily subordinate to the logos and to truth.” (1)

This position has profound linguistic and philosophical consequences. It implies that meaning does not derive from an external origin or metaphysical ground but is born within the very system of signs. Derrida’s formulation—“il n’y a pas de hors-texte,” or “there is nothing outside the text”—captures this shift in ontology and epistemology. This essay explores how Nietzsche’s view of writing as “originary” informs Derrida’s critique of metaphysics, aligns with Saussure’s systemic view of language, and finds a powerful echo in Nietzsche’s own formulation: “there is nothing outside the whole.” (2)

1. Nietzsche and the Originary Nature of Writing

In Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche sets out to dismantle the foundations of traditional philosophy by targeting its “Four Great Errors”: causality, free will, moral responsibility, and dualistic oppositions such as good and evil. These errors are all grounded in metaphysical illusions—presumptions of fixed truth, moral teleology, or divine origin. Nietzsche’s rejection of these constructs culminates in a striking aphorism: “Es gibt nichts außer dem Ganzen”—“There is nothing outside the whole.” (3) This expresses his view of reality as an immanent totality, devoid of external purpose or underlying truth.

Derrida seizes on this vision to develop his own critique of metaphysical presence. Nietzsche’s denial of a transcendent truth behind phenomena resonates with Derrida’s insistence that writing, including Nietzsche’s own, is not a mirror of truth but its production site. As Derrida notes, Nietzsche “has written that writing—and first of all his own—is not originarily subordinate to the logos and to truth.” (4) Writing, in this sense, is performative rather than representational; it inaugurates rather than transmits meaning.

2. Derrida’s Deconstruction of the Origin

Yet Derrida is not content to assert that writing is “originary.” He places the term in quotation marks, signaling his suspicion of the metaphysical weight that the concept of “origin” usually carries. In Derrida’s view, there is no pure point of origin untouched by mediation. The so-called origin is always already a trace, caught in the play of différance—the dual process of deferring and differing that makes meaning possible.

This is where Derrida introduces the notion of arche-writing, a kind of writing that predates both spoken and written language. It is not a literal script but the structural condition for signification as such. The origin, for Derrida, is thus always inscribed—never present in itself, never anterior to representation. In aligning Nietzsche’s view of writing with this framework, Derrida affirms that meaning is not given but generated, and that the quest for a transcendental signified is misguided from the start.

3. Language, System, and the Internal Genesis of Meaning

Derrida’s engagement with Nietzsche also brings him into proximity with Saussure. Saussure had already argued that language is a system of differences without positive terms, where the value of each sign emerges from what it is not. As he puts it, “in language, there are only differences, and no positive terms.” (5) Derrida appropriates this structural insight, albeit critically.

In this context, Nietzsche’s view that writing constitutes meaning, not reflects it, aligns closely with the idea that meaning arises within the system itself, not from some external reference. The “signified,” if it exists at all, is the result of internal relations rather than correspondence with a reality beyond language. Each philosophical or linguistic system thus becomes a self-enclosed field of play, where truth is an effect rather than a ground.

4. “Nothing Outside the Text” and “Nothing Outside the Whole”

Derrida’s dictum “il n’y a pas de hors-texte” is often misunderstood as a solipsistic or nihilistic claim. But in light of Nietzsche’s “there is nothing outside the whole,” the phrase takes on a more rigorous philosophical meaning. Both thinkers deny the existence of an external foundation—whether divine, metaphysical, or moral—that would anchor interpretation or being. For Nietzsche, the “whole” is a dynamic, immanent field in which everything is interconnected; for Derrida, the “text” is a similarly all-encompassing field of signification, always in motion, never closed.

This shared rejection of transcendence leads to a similar epistemological conclusion: meaning is internal, contingent, and relational. There is no outside authority to appeal to, no hidden truth waiting to be uncovered. To read Nietzsche, for Derrida, is to accept that even writing about writing does not escape the play of the text—it only deepens it.

Conclusion

Derrida’s engagement with Nietzsche in Of Grammatology is not a mere citation but a profound alignment of philosophical projects. Nietzsche’s insight that writing does not reflect a prior truth but constitutes meaning becomes a cornerstone of Derrida’s deconstructive method. In rejecting the idea of an “originarily” present truth, both thinkers challenge the foundations of Western metaphysics, dismantling the privileging of speech, presence, and transcendence.

The implications are far-reaching. Language, truth, and meaning no longer depend on a stable ground but arise within systems of differential relations. Whether through Nietzsche’s “whole” or Derrida’s “text,” we are presented with a vision of reality and language that is immanent, fluid, and always already inscribed. In this view, to read is to engage not with a hidden truth but with the endless play of differences that constitutes meaning itself.

Related Post

“There Is Nothing Outside”: A Parallel Between Nietzsche and Derrida’s Radical Critiques of Metaphysics

https://derridaforlinguists.blogspot.com/2024/12/blog-post_06.html

Halting the Infinite Regress: Why Every System Needs Its Own Transcendental Signified

https://derridaforlinguists.blogspot.com/2025/04/blog-post_05.html

References

  1. Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 17.
  2. Ibid., 158. 
  3. Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin, 1990), 51.
  4. Derrida, Of Grammatology, 17. 
  5. Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, trans. Wade Baskin (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), 120. 

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